How Thailand Turned a Border Dispute Into an Illegal War — And Won an Election on It

A New York Editorial investigation finds that while Cambodia engineered the political crisis that made conflict possible, Thailand's response violated foundational principles of international law — and every institution that tried to stop it was told no.

The New York Editorial | International Investigations Unit | February 19, 2026

Read the full Analytical Report: https://thenyeditorial.github.io/Thailand-Cambodia-Conflict-Report-Feb-2026/ For nine months, the dominant narrative of the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict has been one of mutual blame: two countries, two sets of grievances, two sides to every story. Thai media calls Cambodia "Scambodia." Cambodian officials call Thailand an occupier. Western coverage splits the difference and moves on.

A New York Editorial investigation — drawing on analysis from CSIS, Human Rights Watch, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Atlantic Council, FinCEN, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, and more than 80 additional sources — finds that this framing is wrong. Not because Cambodia is innocent. It isn't. But because the scale, nature, and legality of what each side did are fundamentally different, and treating them as equivalent obscures who is actually responsible for the catastrophe along the 817-kilometer border that has killed at least 149 people and displaced 640,000 civilians.

Cambodia lit a match. What Thailand did next broke international law.

What Cambodia did — and why it matters

Any honest account of this conflict must start with Cambodia's provocations. They are documented not by Thai propaganda but by FinCEN, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, the State Department's Trafficking in Persons Report, and Amnesty International. They are serious.

Cambodia's ruling establishment built and protected a $12.5 billion annual scam economy — roughly half the country's formal GDP — that enslaves over 100,000 trafficking victims in more than 300 compounds. FinCEN found that Huione Group, whose payments subsidiary lists Hun Sen's nephew Hun To as a major shareholder and director, laundered at least $4 billion in illicit proceeds, including $37 million for North Korea's Lazarus Group. The U.S. sanctioned 146 targets in the Prince Group criminal network, led by Chen Zhi, who served as adviser to both the current and former prime ministers. The State Department concluded that Cambodian officials "financially benefit from human trafficking."

When Thailand threatened this economy — through casino legalization and a border crackdown — Cambodia's former strongman Hun Sen responded with political warfare. He secretly recorded a phone call with Thai PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra, in which she called him "uncle" and described her own army commander as adversarial, then released it publicly. Bangkok's stock exchange dropped 4.17 percent. Paetongtarn's coalition collapsed. She was removed from office within weeks. The East Asia Forum concluded that Cambodia's leadership "engineered a border crisis." Simultaneously, Hun Sen recalled 400,000 Cambodian migrant workers from Thailand, crippling its agriculture and construction sectors.

During the July fighting that followed, Cambodian BM-21 rockets struck residential areas, a hospital, and a gas station in Thailand's Sisaket province, killing 14 civilians, including children. This was a clear violation of international humanitarian law.

These acts are the reason this conflict exists. Cambodia engineered the political destruction of the only Thai government that was pursuing de-escalation, protected a criminal economy at the expense of its own citizens and victims worldwide, and used indiscriminate weapons against Thai civilians.

But provocation is not permission. And under international law, what matters is not only who started a fight but what was done in response — and whether every available alternative to violence was exhausted first.

It was not.

The response that broke international law

Proportionality

On July 23, 2025, a Thai soldier stepped on a landmine. He was seriously injured. Within 24 hours, Thailand had deployed F-16 fighter jets in combat for the first time since 1988, launched airstrikes across 12 border sites, and used cluster munitions in populated areas.

Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, self-defense must be proportionate to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it. The ICJ held in the Nicaragua case that this is a requirement of customary international law, not a suggestion. A landmine injury to one soldier, escalated within hours into an air campaign involving fighter jets and cluster munitions across a broad front, fails any serious proportionality test.

In December, another landmine injured two soldiers. Thailand responded with Operation Sattawat — a named ground offensive deploying tanks, F-16s, Gripens, and a naval blockade. Towns and strategic hills inside Cambodia were seized. Cambodia's entire military budget is $1.3 billion. Thailand's is $5.7 billion. Reporters on the ground filmed Cambodian soldiers fighting in t-shirts and flip-flops against a professional military with precision-guided munitions.

A landmine incident does not legally justify a ground invasion of a neighboring country.

Cluster munitions

After initially denying Cambodia's accusations, a Thai military spokesperson acknowledged on July 25 that cluster munitions had been used, stating they could be deployed "when necessary." Human Rights Watch called any use of cluster munitions in populated areas "unlawfully indiscriminate" under international humanitarian law.

In October, a 10-year-old boy named Sern Sovann died after picking up an unexploded M-85 submunition from a field near his home. The Cambodian Mine Action Centre confirmed it was fired by Thailand during July. The 2025 Cluster Munition Monitor listed Thailand alongside Russia and Myanmar among countries using these weapons. That year, 100 percent of cluster munition casualties worldwide were civilians. Nearly half were children.

The sovereignty question nobody asked

This investigation finds that Thailand's most legally vulnerable act has been the least scrutinized: its bombing of scam compounds inside Cambodian territory.

Thailand's actions on its own soil — cutting telecom signals, blocking fuel exports, arresting operators at the border — were sovereign acts within its own borders. Aggressive, yes. But legal.

The moment Thailand bombed targets inside Cambodia, the legal calculus changed entirely. Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the use of force against another sovereign state is prohibited, with only two exceptions: Security Council authorization (which Thailand never received) or self-defense under Article 51.

Scam centers are not an armed attack. Thai citizens losing billions to online fraud is a law enforcement problem, not a casus belli. The established legal remedies — bilateral cooperation, international sanctions, financial disruption, judicial mechanisms — were available and, in the case of U.S. sanctions against Huione and the Prince Group, already being deployed.

Thailand attempted to bridge this gap by claiming the scam compounds were simultaneously criminal operations and military facilities. CSIS noted that the "military use of these sites remains contested." But even if the dual-use claim were true, it does not resolve the proportionality problem. Inside these compounds were thousands of trafficking victims — people the UN Human Rights Chief had specifically urged be evacuated. There is no evidence any evacuation occurred before the strikes. Thailand bombed buildings full of enslaved people while claiming to fight on their behalf.

If bombing another country's criminal enterprises were an acceptable exercise of self-defense, the United States could bomb Mexican cartel compounds. India could strike militant camps in Pakistan. The principle at stake is foundational, and Thailand's actions undermined it.

Rejection of every peaceful alternative

Perhaps the most legally significant finding of this investigation is the pattern: Thailand systematically refused every mechanism for peaceful resolution that was offered by anyone.

During July: Thailand rejected mediation from the United States, China, and Malaysia. Cambodia's ambassador to the UN called for an immediate ceasefire. Thailand's acting PM said, "I don't think we need any mediation from a third country yet."

After July: Cambodia petitioned the International Court of Justice. Thailand rejected its jurisdiction. The Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord was signed in October. Thailand suspended it after two weeks.

During December: Trump called both leaders and announced a ceasefire. Thailand's foreign ministry publicly disputed it, saying his remarks did not "reflect an accurate understanding of the situation." Airstrikes continued the next morning. Anutin told reporters: "I no longer care about trade and tariff negotiations. We don't have to listen to anyone."

Cambodia, by contrast, pursued every available mechanism. It petitioned the ICJ. It requested a UN Security Council session. It agreed to every ASEAN mediation proposal. It accepted both ceasefire frameworks. It called for Joint Boundary Commission technical work. It endorsed Malaysia and the U.S. as ceasefire monitors.

Under the UN Charter, states have an obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means. Self-defense under Article 51 requires that force be necessary — meaning no less harmful alternative exists. When a state refuses every less harmful alternative offered by the United States, China, Malaysia, ASEAN, and the United Nations, the necessity claim collapses. You cannot argue that bombing was your only option when you told every mediator on earth to go away.

Post-ceasefire occupation

The December 27 ceasefire ended active hostilities. Under customary international law, occupation can only be proportionate while an active threat persists. Once an armed attack has been halted, "ongoing occupation is no longer necessary."

Yet as of mid-February 2026, Thai forces remain in 14 areas inside what Cambodia claims as its territory. Reuters reports razor wire and shipping containers blocking access to 292 hectares of residential and agricultural land in Banteay Meanchey province. More than 1,300 houses are affected. Approximately 4,600 people in Prey Chan and Chouk Chey communes remain in temporary shelters because their land is inaccessible.

On February 2, Thailand conducted what may be the single most extraordinary act of the entire conflict: it led foreign military attachés and FBI agents to inspect scam compound sites in O'Smach, 397 meters inside Cambodian territory, without Cambodian consent. Cambodia called it their "strongest protest" ever and accused Thailand of attempting to "legitimise the occupation of Cambodian territory."

Anutin's post-election promise to build a permanent wall along the border confirms what the occupation already suggests: Thailand is not preparing to leave.

The war as an election strategy

This investigation finds that the conflict's most consequential outcome was not territorial but political — and that this outcome was engineered.

On December 12, as Thai F-16s were bombing Cambodian positions and half a million civilians were fleeing, Anutin dissolved parliament and called snap elections for February 8. Political analysts across the region noted he was "timing his move to ride a surge in nationalist sentiment." His campaign slogan was effectively a promise to fight: "I promise to safeguard Thailand with my life."

The gamble succeeded beyond any reasonable expectation. Bhumjaithai won 194 seats — nearly tripling its 2023 result and securing the first decisive conservative victory in Thailand this century. The progressive People's Party, which had won 151 seats under its predecessor in 2023, collapsed to 116. Pheu Thai, the Shinawatra dynasty's vehicle, had its worst result since founding, losing even Thaksin's hometown of Chiang Mai. A 72-year-old former Pheu Thai voter told Reuters: "Do you know why Anutin managed to catch up? Because he stood up to Cambodia."

ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute's Fulcrum captured the structural significance: "The renewed clashes cannot be understood simply as a contested border dispute. The resurgence of military confrontation reveals a deeper structural dynamic: the instrumentalisation of nationalism for domestic political survival in Thailand."

The conflict accomplished what 13 coups since 1932 had always achieved through other means — cementing the royalist-military establishment's grip on Thai politics. The difference is that this time it was done through a democratic election, making it far harder to reverse. As CNN reported, the new government may be "more stable, but I don't think necessarily more democratic." The day after the election, 44 progressive lawmakers were found guilty of trying to amend the draconian lese-majeste law. Ten were newly elected. They face lifetime bans from politics.

The people between the wire

As of early February 2026, nearly 98,000 people remain displaced. Over 51,000 are women. Over 31,000 are children. Forty-eight schools and 22 health facilities remain closed across Cambodia's affected provinces. At the height of the December fighting, 1,168 Thai schools and 1,039 Cambodian schools were shuttered, disrupting education for nearly a quarter million students. Some families returned home, found unexploded ordnance in their fields, and went back to the camps. World Vision documented households "re-displacing" multiple times.

For four consecutive nights in October, between the two rounds of fighting, a Thai nationalist influencer — with official permission from the Thai Army's First Army Area command — positioned high-powered loudspeakers at the border and blasted ghost wailing, funeral music, and fighter jet sounds into the Cambodian villages of Prey Chan and Chouk Chey from roughly 11 p.m. until after 3 a.m. The villages are home to over 3,000 people, including infants. A one-year-old boy became afraid at night.

Psychologists warned of permanent developmental harm in children under five. Thailand's own Office of the Attorney-General warned the broadcasts could violate the Convention Against Torture. Anutin said it wouldn't hurt Thailand's credibility.

The trafficking victims inside the bombed scam compounds may have occupied the most terrible position of all: enslaved by criminal enterprises, bombed by a foreign military that claimed to be liberating them, and invisible in every diplomatic communiqué that followed.

What this investigation concludes

Cambodia created the conditions for this war. It built a criminal empire, destroyed the Thai government that might have prevented escalation, and used rockets that killed children. Those facts are not in dispute and they are not minor.

But creating conditions for a war and waging one illegally are different categories of culpability. What matters under international law is not only who provoked, but what was done in response — whether force was necessary, whether it was proportionate, whether alternatives were exhausted, and whether the laws of war were respected.

On every one of those questions, Thailand fails.

It responded to landmine injuries with F-16 airstrikes and cluster munitions. It rejected mediation from the United States, China, Malaysia, ASEAN, and the United Nations. It launched a named ground offensive and seized Cambodian territory. It bombed trafficking victims without evacuating them. It terrorized sleeping children under official military sanction. It occupied 14 areas after a ceasefire. It conducted law enforcement operations on foreign soil without consent. It dissolved parliament during active hostilities and converted the conflict into an election platform. And it is now building a wall.

The Documentation Center of Cambodia offered what may be the most clarifying analysis of this entire conflict: "A more sober-minded perspective is that this is an internal Thai struggle that has invited the leveraging of long-simmering historical tensions."

Proeung Sopheap, 59, went home to collect her cooking utensils and found razor wire where her village used to be.

That is the story of this war. And it is not over.

This investigation draws on reporting and analysis from CSIS, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Atlantic Council, East Asia Forum, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (Fulcrum), The Diplomat, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Cluster Munition Coalition, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNESCO, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, FinCEN, OFAC, the U.S. Department of State, World Vision, Save the Children, the Documentation Center of Cambodia, Al Jazeera, Reuters, BBC, PBS, Bloomberg, TIME, CNN, CNBC, the Associated Press, the South China Morning Post, Asia Times, Cambodianess, Khmer Times, Khaosod English, the Nation Thailand, the Japan Times, Britannica, and the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord documentation. Casualty and displacement figures reflect the best available estimates as of publication.